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1 Introduction
A number of naturalistic philosophers have been trying to integrate theories of 
mental representation within the domain of evolution and biological function. 
In particular, these philosophers suggest that adaptationism, which is central 
to the Darwinian science, can provide a ground for anti-individualist, or ex-
ternalist, accounts of representational states that have become dominant in 
philosophy of mind. Adaptationism is usually presented as an empirical claim 
about the causes of phenotypic traits. For starters, we can make do with Elliott 
Sober’ deﬁ nition:
Natural selection has been the only important cause of most of the phenotypic 
traits found in most species. (Sober 1996, 72)
Sober is clear in treating adaptationism as an empirical thesis, albeit the 
one whose truth-value could be determined “only in the long run” (ibid.). How-
ever, some philosophers as well as scientists have meant something a lot stron-
ger by “adaptationism.” But we shall come back to that later. At any rate, it 
seems beyond doubt that psychological anti-individualism is deﬁ nitely not a 
mere empirical claim. It is meant to be a metaphysical thesis about the nature 
of representational states. Most of traditional philosophy of mind, in virtue 
of its assumption that representational mental states can be fully character-
ized by attending solely to the properties and states internal to the individual’s 
bearer of these states, has been individualistic. By contrast, anti-individualism 
is a relatively recent theory originated by Tyler Burge. According to his recent 
deﬁ nition, anti-individualism is the claim that 
the natures of many mental states constitutively depend on relations between 
a subject matter beyond the individual and the individual that has the mental 
states, where relevant relations help determine speciﬁ c natures of those states. 
(Burge 2010, 61)
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Burge means that many mental states, speciﬁ cally those that are representa-
tional, would not be what they are, unless the relevant relations to the external 
environment were in place. Therefore, the idea of a constitutive dependence 
of representational states of relations between the individual and her environ-
ment is distinct from the idea that mental states causally depend on such 
external relations. The latter idea is quite acceptable to many individualists. 
However, while agreeing that thoughts or perceptions are prompted by events 
in the external environment, individualists go on to claim that those mental 
states are then fully identiﬁ able in terms of factors internal to the individual. 
Constitutive dependence is also stronger than metaphysical dependence. Ne-
cessities such as that it’s true of each mental state that it is not a number or 
made of cheese are weaker than constitutive dependence because they do not 
ﬁ gure in explanation of the nature of mental states.
These are the claims about the character of the relations between men-
tal representations and their environment. The further issue to consider is 
whether the mind reduces to its external relations; in other words, whether it 
belongs in the ontological category of relation. Burge resists this conclusion 
with an example from biology: “It is constitutively necessary that to be a heart, 
an organ must have the function of pumping blood through a circulatory sys-
tem” (ibid., 66). However,
the relations to these other entities are not part of the internal structure of the 
heart. Nor is the heart itself a relation. Thus the nature of the heart is consti-
tutively dependent for being what it is on relations to things beyond it. But the 
heart itself has a structure that is not made up of those relations. I think that 
representational mind is like that. (Ibid.) 
Now, the idea behind the naturalization project under discussion here is to 
present anti-individualism as an implication of adaptationism, whether the lat-
ter is thoroughly empirical in nature or something else. Thus, Daniel Dennett 
claims that 
Burge’s anti-individualistic thesis is then simply a special case of a very fa-
miliar observation: functional characterizations are relative not only to the 
embedding environment, but also to assumptions about optimality of design. 
(Dennett 1987, 310)
In other words, Dennett suggests that anti-individualism is implied by the 
fact that the ascription of representational states, which he construes as func-
tional states in the biological sense, presupposes a description of the selec-
tionist history of these states. It is precisely this appeal to history that is sup-
posed to supply the required external component—i.e., something outside the 
individual—of the identity conditions of representational states. Likewise, in 
her elaborate theory of psychological explanation as a species of biofunctional 
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explanation, Ruth Millikan argues that the functions in question are to be char-
acterized historically. She says:
I would like to explore implications for the science of psychology of the thesis that 
the categories of intentional psychology are function categories in the biologist’s 
sense of “function,” taking this to be a sense in which function is determined by 
evolutionary history rather than by current dispositions. (Millikan 1993, 171)
Thus, Dennett and Millikan share a conviction that anti-individualism can 
be vindicated as a feature of a psychology understood as an oﬀ shoot of the 
adaptationist program in biology. In short, their defence of anti-individualism 
assumes that psychological explanation is of a kind with biological explana-
tion. In addition to the reductionist attitude towards psychology, contem-
porary naturalists also miss the metaphysical character of the thesis of anti-
individualism. With an approving reference to Millikan’s work on biological 
function, Dennett says that it is a particular individual’s historical origin that 
“licenses a certain way of speaking” (Dennett 1987, 292) of her states. It is on 
the basis of the selectionist history of an organism or the design history of an 
artefact that we may describe certain of their states as serving the purpose of 
representing their environment. However, this means that Dennett and other 
naturalists interpret anti-individualism as a mere semantical thesis. That is, 
anti-individualism turns out to be a claim about how certain internal states 
of the individual ought to be described—namely, by including the mention of 
some facts external to the individual, in particular those about her history. For 
Dennett, this semantical reinterpretation of anti-individualism is part of his 
rejection of what he calls original intentionality. This is the claim that humans 
possess genuine minds while other candidates (e.g., computers and other arte-
facts) have minds only by proxy. Dennett argues that there are no minds at the 
bedrock. All intentionality is derived.
Burge rejects both the reduction of psychology to biology and of the meta-
physical thesis to a semantical thesis. As for the former, in his recent book, 
Origins of Objectivity, he asserts:
The explanatory content and goals of theories of perception and belief are not 
the same as those that underwrite biology. Explaining the way veridical and 
non-veridical representational states arise, given proximal stimulation, is a dif-
ferent explanatory enterprise from that of explaining any states in terms of their 
biological functions—their contributions to ﬁ tness. So biological explanations 
cannot reduce explanations whose point is to explain accuracy and inaccuracy 
of representational states. Since what they explain is diﬀ erent, the former can-
not take over the job of the latter. (Burge 2010, 303)
As for the metaphysical character of anti-individualism, recall that Burge 
makes clear in his deﬁ nition of the thesis that it concerns the very natures of 
mental representations. Thus, while no one can claim a monopoly on the usage 
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of technical philosophical claims such as “anti-individualism,” it appears that 
naturalists give it a substantially diﬀ erent meaning from Burge.
However, in this chapter, I do not wish so much as adjudicate the dispute 
between Burge and the Darwinian naturalists. Rather, I plan to analyze the ar-
guments on both sides in order to understand the grounds of the disagreement 
better. I start with explicating the naturalists’ strategy to derive anti-individu-
alism from adaptationism (section 2). In the process, I note some important 
diﬀ erences between Dennett and Millikan, especially over intentional realism. 
It turns out that Millikan does not share Dennett’s view that all intentionality 
is merely derived; in this respect her position is closer to Burge’s. And yet, 
Burge rejects Millikan’s naturalism as well, on the grounds that her construal 
of representation is as far removed as Dennett’s from the actual practice of 
psychology (section 4). However, I shall also point out a certain discrepancy in 
Burge’s argument. We have already seen him appealing to a particular example 
of the biological organ, the heart, in explicating the character of the environ-
mental dependence of mental representations. Elsewhere he used it to argue 
for the autonomous character of psychology. Now Burge’s example is repeated 
almost verbatim by Millikan in her theory of biofunctional explanation. And, 
curiously, the example implies an individualistic understanding of psychology 
that Burge oﬃ  cially rejects (section 3).
2 Adaptationism and Anti-Individualism
Let us start by looking at the details of anti-individualist arguments. This should 
be interesting because both Burge and the naturalists appeal to very similar 
thought experiments. These are the notorious thought experiments featuring 
physically identical, yet intentionally distinct, individuals, whose intentional 
diﬀ erence is explained in terms of a diﬀ erence between the two individuals’ 
social or physical environments. Burge summarizes both types of his thought 
experiment as follows:
Consider a person A who thinks that aluminium is a light metal used in sailboat 
masts, and a person B who believes that he or she has arthritis in the thigh. We 
assume that A and B can pick out instances of aluminium and arthritis (respec-
tively) and know many familiar general facts about aluminium and arthritis. A 
is, however, ignorant of aluminium’s chemical structure and micro-properties. 
B is ignorant of the fact that arthritis cannot occur outside of joints. Now we 
can imagine counterfactual cases in which A and B’s bodies have their same 
histories considered in isolation of their physical environments, but in which 
there are signiﬁ cant environmental diﬀ erences from the actual situation. A’s 
counterfactual environment lacks aluminium and has in its places a similar-
looking light metal. B’s counterfactual environment is such that no one has ever 
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isolated arthritis as a speciﬁ c disease, or syndrome of diseases. In these cases, 
A would lack “aluminium thoughts” and B would lack “arthritis thoughts.” As-
suming natural developmental patterns, both would have diﬀ erent thoughts. 
(Burge 2007, 222-223)
Burge notes that the diﬀ erence between the two individuals cannot be reduced 
to a diﬀ erence in the causal origin of two tokens of the same type of a repre-
sentation. Each token representation is of a diﬀ erent type because each has a 
diﬀ erent content. And the ascriptions of mental representations are “literal.” 
Dennett’s story features artiﬁ cial devices rather than human protagonists:
Consider a standard soft-drink vending machine, designed and built in the Unit-
ed States, and equipped with a transducer device for accepting and rejecting 
US quarters. Let’s call such a device a two-bitser. Normally, when a quarter 
is inserted into a two-bitser, the two-bitser goes into a state, call it Q, which 
“means”(note the scare-quotes) “I perceive/accept a genuine US quarter now.” 
Such two-bitsers are quite clever and sophisticated, but hardly foolproof. They 
do “make mistakes” (more scare-quotes). That is, unmetaphorically, sometimes 
they go into state Q when a slug or other foreign object is inserted in them, and 
sometimes they reject perfectly legal quarters—they fail to go into state Q when 
they are supposed to. (Dennett 1987, 290; emphasis in the original) 
Now suppose one such vending machine is installed in Panama, where they use 
quarter-balboas, which are physically indistinguishable from quarter-dollars as 
far as the machine is concerned. So the two-bitser works correctly when ac-
cepting the quarter-balboas in this setting, though this would have counted as 
a mistake while the machine were located in the US. The question is how to 
identify the state the machine goes into when accepting balboas in Panama. 
An individualist would clearly say that no matter where it is located, the two-
bitser goes into the same state Q; the only diﬀ erence is its causal history. An 
anti-individualist suggests that while the physical state that the machine enters 
remains the same across the two environments, intentionally speaking the ma-
chine located in Panama goes into a diﬀ erent state—say, QB.
It is important to realize that unlike Burge, Dennett considers the choice 
between the two alternatives strictly speaking indeterminate. We can appeal 
to the fact that the vending machine is a functional device. It was designed 
by human engineers to serve certain purposes they had in mind. So there are 
some historical facts—facts about the origin—due to which the machine may be 
characterized as a device designed to give out soft drinks in exchange for the 
US quarters. If so, then also the state of the machine placed in Panama should 
be characterized in terms of the function it was selected for. With a reference 
to Millikan’s biological deﬁ nition of function (the details of which we shall 
discuss in section 4), Dennett claims that
172 Tomáš Hříbek
whether [the two-bitser’s] Panamanian debut counts as going into state Q or 
state QB depends on whether, in its new niche, it was selected for its capacity to 
detect quarter-balboas—literally selected, e.g., by the holder of the Panamanian 
Pepsi-Cola franchise. If it was so selected, then even though its new proprietors 
might have forgotten to reset its counter, its ﬁ rst “perceptual” act would count as 
a correct identiﬁ cation by a q-balber, for that is what it would now be for. [...] If, 
on the other hand, the two-bitser was sent to Panama by mistake, or if it arrived 
by sheer coincidence, its debut would mean nothing, though its utility might 
soon—immediately—be recognized and esteemed by the relevant authorities [...], 
and thereupon its subsequent states would counts as tokens of QB. (Ibid., 293; 
emphasis in the original)
Dennett is conﬁ dent that Burge and other intentional realists would agree that 
intentional ascription in the case of artefacts is a matter of practical expedi-
ency, or perspective, or stance. In the case of persons, however, these realists 
would insist that there was a fact of the matter whether someone meant alu-
minium, or arthritis, or whatever. But I suggest leaving the controversy over 
intentional realism for the following section.
Rather, let us now turn to the justiﬁ cation behind Dennett and Millikan’s 
identiﬁ cation of representational states in terms of natural functions or pur-
poses. This natural teleology is justiﬁ ed by that particular interpretation of evo-
lutionary biology that I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter—namely, 
adaptationism. According to the deﬁ nition that I quoted, adaptationism is the 
conviction that natural selection is only a signiﬁ cant source of the observed 
diversity of living forms. But let us introduce some distinctions here. Sober’s 
deﬁ nition closely corresponds to what Peter Godfrey-Smith calls empirical ad-
aptationism, namely the claim that
[n]atural selection is a powerful and ubiquitous force, and [...] [t]o a large de-
gree, it is possible to predict and explain the outcome of evolutionary processes 
by attending only to the role played by selection. (Godfrey-Smith 2001, 336)
This should be distinguished from two stronger theses: explanatory adaptation-
ism, according to which
[t]he apparent design of organisms, and the relations of adaptedness between 
organisms and their environments, are the big questions, the amazing facts of 
biology [...] Natural selection is the key to solving these problems; selection is 
the big answer (ibid.; emphasis in the original),
and methodological adaptationism, which says that
[t]he best way for scientists to approach biological systems is to look for fea-
tures of adaptation and good design. Adaptation is a good “organizing concept” 
for evolutionary research. (Ibid., 337)
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Godfrey-Smith argues that Dennett and Dawkins are explanatory adap-
tationists, sometimes even combining this—as when they marvel at the sheer 
amount of adaptive features in nature—with the empirical claim. I shall leave 
Dawkins aside, but I think that Dennett in particular actually subscribes to the 
strongest, i.e. methodological, adaptationism.
Consider such dramatic comments from Dennett’s popular book, Darwin’s 
Dangerous Idea (1995) as:
Adaptationist reasoning is not optional: it is the heart and soul of evolutionary 
biology. Although it may be supplemented, and its ﬂ aws repaired, to think of 
displacing it from central position in biology is to imagine not just the downfall 
of Darwinism but the collapse of modern biochemistry and all the life sciences 
and medicine. (Dennett 1995, 238)
It seems that Dennett claims here that the assumption of good adaptedness is 
not just a correct answer to the key question of biology, but precisely a “good 
organizing principle” of all the life sciences, without which they would be 
unthinkable. I shall elaborate on this in a minute. But ﬁ rst, I need to take note 
of the fact that precisely the radical challenge to adaptationism that Dennett 
ﬁ nds unthinkable arose in the midst of the biological science, in the famous 
paper by Stephen J. Gould and Richard Lewontin “The Spandrels of San Mar-
co and the Panglossian Paradigm” (1978). In it, Gould and Lewontin deplore 
the assumption of
the near omnipotence of natural selection in forging the best among possible 
worlds. This program regards natural selection as so powerful and the con-
straints upon it so few that direct production of adaptation through its opera-
tion becomes the primary cause of nearly all organic form, function, and behav-
iour. (Gould and Lewontin 1978, 76) 
For Gould and Lewontin, many adaptationist explanations are unfalsiﬁ able 
“just-so stories,” and many alleged adaptations are mere “spandrels”—non-opti-
mal by-products of a variety of constraints on natural selection. Godfrey-Smith 
argues Gould and Lewontin seek to undermine both empirical and method-
ological adaptationisms. Or, more precisely, they wish to uproot methodologi-
cal adaptationism by depriving it of the support it gets from the alleged empiri-
cal evidence of good design.
Now back to Dennett’s notion of adaptationism. Compared to Millikan 
who dismisses Gould’s arguments, especially his rejection of adaptive char-
acter of cognitive capacities (see Millikan 1993, 46-47), Dennett is concilia-
tory. He interprets Gould and Lewontin’s critique as a useful reminder that we 
should be careful, not hasty, adaptationists. But he rejects their suggestion to 
supplant adaptationism with the idea of Baupläne—the by now largely defunct 
theory that adaptation was good enough to explain certain superﬁ cial features 
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of the design of organisms, but not their fundamental “body plans” (cf. Gould 
and Lewontin 1978, 85-89). Drawing on his distinction between “cranes” and 
“skyhooks” (cf. Dennett 1995, 73), Dennett asks what else than a mysterious 
skyhook could pull a complete body plan into existence, if the humble crane 
of natural selection were prohibited? Yet the most important point brought up 
by Dennett against Gould and Lewontin’s critique is that they misunderstand 
the nature of adaptationism. The latter is not strictly speaking a theory. Only a 
theory—a collection of claims—could be either falsiﬁ ed or unfalsiﬁ able. Rather, 
adaptationism is a stance that biologists are bound to adopt vis-à-vis the process 
of natural selection, lest they miss certain real patterns in nature.
The concept of a stance is, of course, an import from Dennett’s philosophy 
of mind. Dennett argues that something is a bearer of representations only 
from the standpoint of an “intentional stance,” which ascribes these represen-
tations under the constraint of an ideal rationality. As he puts it
all there is to being a true believer is being a system whose behavior is reliably 
predictable via the intentional strategy, and hence all there is to really and truly 
believing that p (for any proposition p) is being an intentional system for which 
p occurs as a belief in the best (most predictive) interpretation. (Dennett 1987, 
29; emphasis in the original)
Thus, the intentional stance licenses mentalism, while adaptationism licenses a 
sort of natural teleology. The two stances are analogous in that the former makes 
an assumption of rationality, whereas the latter that of optimality of design:
When we adopt the intentional stance toward a person, we use an assumption 
of rationality or cognitive/conative optimality to structure our interpretation 
[...] In biology, the adaptationists assume optimality of design in the organisms 
they study. (Dennett 1990, 187; emphasis in the original)
Far from being expressions of naïve optimism either with respect to the ratio-
nality of agents or the optimality of organisms, the intentional stance and adap-
tationism are necessary presuppositions for answering certain “why”-questions. 
In the domain of psychology, we ask why an agent engaged in this or that behav-
iour; and we proceed by inquiring into what a perfect reasoner would do, given 
her circumstances; and in due time we are bound to discover that no agent is 
perfect in her reasoning. In biology, we ask why an organism was designed in 
a particular way; we hypothesize how it should be optimally designed, given 
what we know about its environment; and our prediction is going to be falsiﬁ ed 
(pace Gould and Lewontin, an adaptationist story that were too perfect would 
be useless to biologists, since it would teach them too little). And this is the 
gist of Dennett’s position concerning adaptationism as a stance, which I think 
justiﬁ es its classiﬁ cation as a methodological, not just explanatory, thesis: “Ad-
aptationism and mentalism [...] are not theories in one traditional sense. They 
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are stances or strategies that serve to organize data, explain interrelations, and 
generate questions to ask Nature” (Dennett 1987, 265).
In view of the above, I think that Dennett’s critics—among whom, as we 
shall see in the following section, we must count Burge—who ascribe to him 
the idea that stances are adopted or vacated arbitrarily or opportunistically 
are too quick.
It seems, then, that adaptationism is the basic premise of a Darwinian theo-
ry of the mind. As I already mentioned, adaptationism enables a sort of natural 
teleology. And once there is a room for natural purposes, we are entitled to pos-
it states whose function it is to represent an external environment. Biological 
functions are identiﬁ ed in terms of a past performance of the traits that are so 
functionally deﬁ ned. Hence, representational states, too, are identiﬁ ed in terms 
of what their predecessors were supposed to do. Finally, anti-individualism fol-
lows as a natural upshot of a theory that identiﬁ es all traits of an organism, 
including its representational states, in terms of its historical relations.
This, I take it, is the basic structure of a Darwinian argument justifying a 
version of anti-individualism shared by Dennett and Millikan. I shall return 
to some diﬀ erences between the two philosophers’ speciﬁ c construal of this 
argument in a moment. At this point, it is clear that they agree in seeing anti-
individualism as an almost trivial outcome of a psychology understood as an 
integral part of cognitive ethology. Dennett argues that cognitive ethology be-
comes anti-individualistic once freed from the legacy of behaviourism. He cites 
a particular research on vervet monkeys that have developed, in their natural 
habitat in the Sub-Saharan Africa, a relatively elaborate communication sys-
tem involving several types of warning calls signifying the presence of diﬀ erent 
kinds of predators (see Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). Most of what is interesting 
about the lives of these animals would be simply missed from the perspective of 
behaviourism. For example, only from the intentional stance can we recognize 
a monkey as deceiving—i.e., as wishing to be believed as believing something 
that it does not. Certain fruitful hypotheses can be framed only based on the as-
sumption that the vervets are intentional agents, i.e. having beliefs, intentions, 
fears and a host of other propositional states in the aetiology of their behaviour. 
Dennett argues that cognitive ethologists actually adopt the intentional stance 
towards the animals whose behaviour they study (see Dennett 1987, chap. 7 
and Dennett 1998, chap. 20).
Now, the contrast between mentalism and behaviourism within ethology 
is important for the controversy over psychological anti-individualism in that 
behaviourism is a paradigmatically individualist doctrine. A behaviourist takes 
into account only the narrowly conceived inputs and outputs of behaviour, so 
that two individuals there were behaviourally identical would be psychologi-
cally identically as well. It is thus signiﬁ cant that Dennett stresses that, from the 
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intentional stance, hypotheses about what the observed individuals believe and 
desire need to be framed “by ﬁ guring out what they ought to believe and desire, 
given their circumstances” (Dennett 1998, 292). Only within the particular cir-
cumstances of their natural environment could we ﬁ gure out what, if anything, 
vervet monkeys’ calls possibly mean, and we are licensed to attribute to these 
animals corresponding mental states.
Millikan also construes intentional psychology as part of cognitive ethology, 
but she sees the latter as haunted by the legacy of individualism, rather than 
behaviourism. She writes:
Will a mature cognitive psychology need to characterize its subjects in ways that 
make reference to how they are imbedded in their environments? Or will it be 
“individualistic,” making reference only to what supervenes on the structures 
of individual bodies and brains? The individualists argue that the behavioral 
dispositions of a person clearly depend only on that person’s inner constitution, 
and hence that there can be no need to refer to the individual’s relation to the 
wider environment in order to explain them. The anti-individualists argue that 
it is impossible even to describe much of the behavior that it is psychology’s job 
to explain without reference to the environment. (Millikan 1993, 135; emphasis 
in the original)
As I pointed out in the previous paragraph, behaviourism is naturally inter-
preted as a type of individualism, but Millikan doesn’t reject behaviourism tout 
court. She thinks individualistic and non-individualistic versions of behaviour-
ism could be distinguished. She goes on to spell out the anti-individualistic no-
tion of behaviour with the help of her concept of “proper function,” to which 
we shall return in the next section. Here it suﬃ  ces to say that the proper func-
tion of a trait is identiﬁ ed as that function the (by and large) successful per-
formance of which enabled the trait’s ancestors to copy or reproduce them-
selves in subsequent generations. A proper identiﬁ cation of a trait, including 
a behavioural trait, thus has a necessarily external element in the form of an 
historical dimension. But Millikan adds that the present, not just past, relations 
between behaviours and their environments are a necessary condition of a cor-
rect identiﬁ cation of behaviours. Millikan goes as far as suggesting that psychol-
ogy, properly construed as an integral part of ethology, needs to construe its 
subject matter broadly, as involving both an organism narrowly conceived and 
its natural habitat.
It is a very serious error to think of the subject of the study of psychology and 
ethology as a system spatially contained within the shell or skin of an organism. 
What is inside the shell or skin of the organism is only half of a system; the rest, 
if the organism is lucky, is in the environment. The organismic system, espe-
cially (indeed, by deﬁ nition) the behavioral systems, reach into the environment 
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and are deﬁ ned by what constitute proper, or normal, relations and interactions 
between structures in the organism and in the environment. (Ibid., 158)
Millikan’s broad concept of behaviour is attractive and she seems to be 
careful enough not to extend her thesis into an implausible claim that men-
tal representations themselves, let alone the mind, stretch into the external 
world. Burge himself argues for a broad construal of behaviour (see Burge 
2007, 227), while deploring the tendency, popularized by some idiosyncratic 
anti-individualists, to “extend the mind” beyond the bounds of the body of an 
individual (Clark and Chalmers 1998). 
Earlier, I announced that, despite a broad agreement between them, there 
are important diﬀ erences between Dennett and Millikan’s respective versions 
of a Darwinian theory of the mind. In the remainder of this section, I shall 
touch on two closely related points of diﬀ erence.
Dennett seems to assume that the intentional stance is somehow basic in 
both psychology and biology. We start by making assumptions about what a 
rational agent would do or what an optimal design should look like before we 
inquire about the functional architecture of the agent or the evolutionary origin 
of an organism. By contrast, Millikan argues that the intentional stance needs 
to be underwritten by what Dennett calls the “design stance.” 
where one ignores the actual (possibly messy) details of the physical constitution 
of an object, and, on the assumption that it has a certain design, predicts that 
it will behave as it is designed to behave under various circumstances. (Dennett 
1987, 16-17; emphasis in the original) 
For Millikan, the fact that something is at all interpretable from the intentional 
stance is evidence that it was designed: “There is nothing that exhibits appar-
ently rational patterns for any time or in any detail that was not designed to do 
so, either by natural selection, or by something that natural selection designed” 
(Millikan 2000, 60). In his response to Millikan, Dennett concedes that the 
design stance is more basic “in the sense [Millikan] defends” (Dennett 2000, 
341). That is, anything that is capable of a rich diversity and ﬂ exibility in its 
behavioural and perceptual responses is bound to have been designed either 
artiﬁ cially or, ultimately, by means of natural selection. And yet, until a more 
principled way of distinguishing real intentional systems from merely apparent 
ones become available, Dennett says he prefers to keep his more “open-ended” 
approach that licenses the adoption of the intentional stance even toward sim-
ple artefacts (thermostats) or primitive organisms (frogs).
This last point ultimately rests on our two philosophers’ divergent views of 
the reality of mental states. Millikan is a realist who believes that “folk psychol-
ogy postulates inner items (for example, structures or events or states or enti-
ties),” and that “folk psychology is probably right” (Millikan 1993, chap. 3). 
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As for Dennett, he occasionally committed the tactical error of embracing the 
label “instrumentalist” to describe his theory of representational states (Den-
nett 1987, chaps. 2 and 3). Beside the fact that instrumentalism proves too 
diﬃ  cult to distinguish from ﬁ ctionalism, or just plain old anti-realism, despite 
Dennett’s valiant eﬀ ort (cf. Dennett 1987, 69-81), I think no single label is 
going to do justice to the complexity of his theory. It is true that some of his 
claims sound straightforwardly anti-realistic: “Folk psychology is abstract in 
that the beliefs and desires it attributes are not—or need not be—presumed to 
be intervening distinguishable states of an internal behavior-causing system” 
(Dennett 1987, 53). In other words, it is unlikely that scientiﬁ c psychology will 
discover discrete items in the brain that corresponded to the beliefs and desires 
postulated by folk psychology. So Dennett suggests that we split folk psychol-
ogy—which is a sort of a mixed bag, as it is couched in semantic terms, yet 
also postulating a particular sort of entities—into two new theories. On the one 
hand, there would be the “intentional systems theory”—i.e., an abstract science 
of rationality, akin to decision theory or game theory—and the “sub-personal 
cognitive psychology”—i.e., a concrete science of the neural systems. The for-
mer would be dealing in pure semantics, the latter in pure syntax. I take it that 
the construal of the intentional systems theory as a purely abstract theory is 
supposed to guarantee the metaphysical sanity of Dennett’s willingness to at-
tribute intentional states to natural selection itself. Millikan probably reads her 
own intentional realism into Dennett’s theory when she ﬁ nds the talk of beliefs 
and reasoning of Mother Nature “otiose in biology” (Millikan 2000, 65). She 
elaborates that “there is no sense in such talk because there is nothing in Nature 
analogous to beliefs and nothing that so much as reminds one of inference” (ibid., 
64; emphasis in the original). I think Dennett’s response to this is ingenious:
As Sherlock Holmes, the patron saint of inference, famously said, once you have 
eliminated all other possibilities, the one that remains, however improbable, 
must be the truth. Is that not an inference? Does not Mother Nature eliminate 
all other possibilities, on a vast (not actually Vast) scale, thereby “inferring” the 
best design? When Deep Blue eliminates a few billion legal moves and comes 
to rest on one brilliant continuation, it surely reminds Kasparov of inference! 
(Dennett 2000, 343)
While I am convinced that Dennett’s attribution of intentions to natural selec-
tion is not metaphysically weird for the reasons oﬀ ered by Millikan, I do ﬁ nd a 
metaphysical diﬃ  culty within Dennett’s position. I shall elaborate on it in the 
following section.
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3 Deﬂ ationism and Realism
Burge rejects Dennett’s construal of mental representation. He ﬁ nds this view 
not only implausible, but obviously so: “I mention [it] only to lay it aside” 
(Burge 2010, 293). He dubs it the “deﬂ ationary view” of representation:
On this view, treating something as engaging in representation is merely a mat-
ter of a “stance,” with more or less practical or instrumental value. On such 
a position, there is no objective kind, representation, that can be discovered 
through normal scientiﬁ c investigation. On such a position, there is no more 
theoretical reason to treat an individual as having beliefs or perceptions than 
there is to treat a vending machine, or a planetary system, as representing some-
thing. It is all a matter of practical convenience or optional attitude toward the 
phenomena. (Burge 2010, 293; emphasis in the original)
Dennett returns the favour by dismissing Burge’s position as one more ex-
ample of the traditional belief in the “original intentionality” of human minds, 
from which all other intentionality—ascribable, as the case may be, to the ar-
tefacts of our own design, or to the inanimate objects of nature—is “derived.”
Superﬁ cially at least, Burge unites with Millikan against Dennett with re-
spect to the issue of the reality of representational states. Burge and Millikan 
are intentional realists while Dennett is a sort of anti-realist about the mind. 
Ultimately, however, Burge is going to classify Millikan’s theory, despite its 
realism, as another variant of the sort of naturalism of which an anti-realist 
version is Dennett’s view. Millikan as well as Dennett turn out to be equally 
unacceptable to Burge as two models of a basically reductionist view of the rep-
resentational mind. Yet the arguments on both sides are subtle. I propose, ﬁ rst, 
to rehearse Dennett’s reasons, derived from his understanding of Darwinism, 
for intentional anti-realism; second, I examine Burge’s grounds for rejecting 
both Dennett and Millikan’s naturalistic theories.
Recall that Dennett starts motivating his anti-realism by construing the 
thought experiment placing a lowly artefact, not a person, in two diﬀ erent envi-
ronments. Dennett expects that everybody is going to agree that representation-
al states cannot be attributed to mere artefacts literally, so that an uncertainty 
as to whether to attribute one state rather than another is not disquieting. Next, 
Dennett needs to demonstrate that a similar indeterminacy befalls intentional 
description of persons as well. In other words, he needs to show that in the 
case of persons as well as artefacts, there is no bedrock fact when it comes to 
possessing representational states, but a mere useful way of speaking. For that 
purpose, Dennett oﬀ ers an additional thought experiment.
Suppose someone decided to survive into the twenty-ﬁ fth century in a hiber-
nation device of some sort. He would be wise to make that device mobile, so that 
it can look for the sources of energy. And since these are bound to be scarce, 
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the mobile hibernation device should be capable of ﬁ ghting oﬀ  the machines 
of other people who—as it might be expected—would build survival machines of 
their own. The more sophisticated such machines get, the better their chance 
to deliver their hosts into the future. Hence we might expect the best machines 
would be robots capable of self-control, of setting their own goals based on their 
assessment of a current situation, and so on. Now, the intentional realists such 
as Burge would, according to Dennett, insist that such robots, no matter how 
sophisticated, have whatever fake intentionality they possess, ultimately derived 
from our plans and purposes. But here is the clincher: “the conclusion forced 
upon us is that our own intentionality is exactly like that of the robot, for the 
science-ﬁ ction tale that I have told is not new; it is just a variation of Dawkins’ 
[The Selﬁ sh Gene] vision of us [...] as ‘survival machines’ designed to prolong 
the futures of our selﬁ sh genes” (ibid., 298). Where Dennett’s story started with 
the real meaners as the ultimate source of design, it turns out those meaners 
mean no more literally than the selﬁ sh genes of Dawkins’s story. And yet, Dar-
winism shows that we can get intelligent design without any real minds: “when 
natural selection selects, it can ‘choose’ a particular design for one reason rather 
than another, without ever consciously—or unconsciously!—‘representing’ either 
the choice or the reasons” (ibid., 299, emphasis in the original). Hence we see 
again that not only can we attribute intentions to Mother Nature, despite the 
fact that she is no real reasoner, but a mere process of natural selection—but we 
do the same with persons, despite the fact that, strictly speaking, they are no real 
reasoners, either. There are only ersatz thinkers, but anything can be considered 
as such, if selected properly either artiﬁ cially or naturally.
This is how it works according to Dennett. We attribute beliefs, desires and 
other attitudes to each other, but there is no way these folk psychological states—
imagined to be both semantic and holistic, as well as concrete and discrete, enti-
ties—are going to be recognized by a mature science of psychology. Therefore, 
Dennett suggests splitting folk psychology into two new theories: “one strictly 
abstract, idealizing, holistic, instrumentalistic—pure intentional system theory—
and the other a concrete, microtheoretical science of the actual realization of 
those intentional systems—what I will call sub-personal cognitive psychology” 
(Dennett 1987, 57). At the intentional system level, we are semantic engines; at 
the microtheoretical level, we are physical, or perhaps syntactic systems. How 
do these two levels of description relate to each other? In other words, how does 
the brain, a mere syntactic engine, produce semantics? Dennett answers:
It cannot be designed to do an impossible task, but it could be designed to approxi-
mate the impossible tasks, to mimic the behavior of the impossible object (the 
semantic engine) by capitalizing on close (close enough) fortuitous correspon-
dences between structural regularities—of the environment and of its own internal 
states and operations—and semantics types. (Ibid., 61, emphasis in the original)
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As far as I can see, Dennett suggests that the brain behaves as if it were a seman-
tic engine, in addition to being a syntactic one. We don’t have an ability to build 
brains (yet), but we can build much simpler devices that fulﬁ ll some semanti-
cally characterizable tasks. For instance, we could build a machine that would 
catch the telephone communications that are death threats, by picking out 
words like “… I will kill you…” or “… you… die… unless…” and such (cf. ibid., 
62). If so, we would succeed in building a “death-threat interceptor”—that is, a 
purely syntactic device which is also describable in such semantic terms. The 
machine would be primitive and unreliable, but we could keep on improving it.
This much could be achieved by artiﬁ cial design, but what about natural 
selection? Dennett claims that our brains are dumb syntactic devices that 
were selected for their ability to mimic semantic engines, and have kept on 
getting better at this over time: “in the end all one can hope to produce (all 
natural selection can have produced) are systems that seem to discriminate 
meanings by actually discriminating things (tokens of no doubt wildly dis-
junctive types) that co-vary reliably with meanings” (ibid., 63; emphasis in 
the original). So we can interpret each other intentionally owing to a long 
history of a (more or less) successful coping of our species with its environ-
ment. It is due solely to the beneﬁ t of hindsight aﬀ orded by this history that 
we can appear to be reasoners and meaners.
Burge dismisses this whole approach because he disagrees that the sort of 
responsiveness to stimuli that could be found in nearly all living things captures 
the kind representation employed in psychological explanation. In his critique of 
Dennett, Burge makes a point he has repeated in polemics with many naturalists 
over the decades. The point is that these authors understand the relation be-
tween science and metaphysics backwards. Their projects are driven by various 
metaphysical interests, in particular by the interest to make representation and 
the mind non-mysterious. For example, one worry that seems to have motivated 
a lot of attempts in the past few decades to naturalize intentionality is epiphe-
nomenalism. Many philosophers assumed that all the causal work is done by 
the underlying physical processes, while representations qua representations 
are causally inert. But, according to Burge, we should eschew such preconcep-
tions of a (materialistic) metaphysic and instead begin with studying the actual 
practice of psychological explanation in which intentional idioms ﬁ gure promi-
nently. Such explanation works in everyday contexts and it is part of a mature 
scientiﬁ c psychology as well. Last but not least, it is central to our self-image as 
agents (see Burge 2007, chap. 16). Hence, there is nothing prima facie mysteri-
ous about mental representation as it ﬁ gures in a successful, testable and precise 
psychological explanation.
When it comes to Dennett, it seems that his project of replacing folk psy-
chological concepts—despite the fact they are commonplace in research pro-
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grammes of perceptual psychology and elsewhere—with the two new theories 
of abstract and sub-personal psychology, respectively, is stipulative. It is driven 
by a metaphysical worry that brains do not possess semantic properties. And 
Dennett’s conclusions are unclear. He doesn’t seem to make up his mind as 
to how seriously should the talk of mental states be taken. On the one hand, 
when he says that brains “mimic” semantic engines, or that intentional as-
cription is indeterminate, representations seem merely useful ﬁ ctions. On the 
other hand, he also suggests that brains “realize” semantic states (Dennett 
1987, 67). The relation of realization, familiar from the functionalist literature, 
seems more robust than mere “mimicking.” Yet Dennett does not elucidate 
how similar or diﬀ erent these two relations are.
Burge raises a similar charge of stipulativeness against Millikan’s account of 
representation: “I believe that Millikan’s view amounts to a stipulation about 
how she intends to use ‘representation’” (Burge 2010, 300). He does praise 
her account for separating representation from mere information-carrying. The 
latter is straightforwardly causal, so that an organism goes into a particular 
information-carrying state whenever the appropriate causal prompt is present. 
There is no room for misrepresentation or mistake. We saw how that room is 
created by Millikan’s appeal to selectionist history. A state of an organism can 
misrepresent, if there is a norm set by the past performance of the ancestors 
of that state, since then we can say how the state is supposed to function, even 
though it actually doesn’t. There is nothing in this notion that precludes its 
ascription even to artefacts, as we saw in Dennett’s case. The same phenom-
enon could be described just by using the notion of biological function, normal 
environmental conditions and sensory discrimination. 
4 Historical Function, Systems Function, and Individualism
In this last section, I should like to focus on the concept of function appealed to 
by Dennett and Millikan. It should become clear that this concept motivates a 
version of anti-individualism, which is actually incompatible with Burge’s origi-
nal theory. Which is another way of saying that Dennett and Millikan’s respec-
tive construals of anti-individualism diﬀ er from Burge’s. It is then surprising to 
ﬁ nd even Burge, as he does in his defence of the autonomy of psychology, to 
the biofunctional concept of function, because it results in an inconsistency.
As is well-known, there are two main concepts of function: Millikan’s histori-
cal theory of function and Robert Cummins’s systems theory. I have already ex-
plained some elements of Millikan’s theory earlier in this chapter. A comparison 
with Cummins’s view might help further to clarify the nature of Millikan’s view.
Cummins picks on the complexity of systems of various sorts and ascribes 
functions to such systems on the basis of the workings on their parts. To be 
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more precise, an item x has a function ϕ within a system s, assuming a back-
ground of an analytic explanation of x, which appeals to x’s capacity to ϕ in s. 
Cummins uses an example of the heart to illustrate his proposal: “It is appro-
priate to say that the heart functions as a pump against the background of an 
analysis of the circulatory system’s capacity to transport food, oxygen, wastes, 
and so on, which appeals to the fact that a heart is capable of pumping” (Cum-
mins 1975, 64). Although this example is taken from biology, notice that Cum-
mins could apply his approach in assigning functions to inanimate systems 
as well—thus, our solar system could be regarded as a functional system. Also 
notice that Cummins refers only to the current properties of a functional item, 
and that he conﬁ nes his attention to the internal parts of a system.
Curiously, Millikan also illustrates her alternative theory of function with 
the example of the heart. Let me quote a relevant passage in its entirety:
A heart, for example, may be large or small (elephant or mouse), three-cham-
bered or four-chambered, etc., and it may also be diseased or malformed or 
excised from the body that once contained it, hence unable to pump blood. It 
falls in the category heart, ﬁ rst, because it was produced by mechanisms that 
have proliferated during their evolutionary history in part because they were 
producing items that managed to circulate blood eﬃ  ciently in the species that 
contained them, thus aiding the proliferation of that species. It is a heart, sec-
ond, because it was produced by such mechanisms in accordance with an ex-
planation that approximated, to some undeﬁ ned degree, a Normal explanation 
for production of such items in that species and bears, as a result, some resem-
blance to Normal hearts of that species. By a “Normal explanation” I mean the 
sort of explanation that historically accounts for production of the majority of 
Normal hearts of that species. And by a “normal heart,” I mean a heart that 
matches, in relevant respects, the majority of hearts that, during the history 
of that species, managed to pump blood eﬃ  ciently enough to aid survival and 
reproduction. (Millikan 1993, 55)
Although Millikan agrees with Cummins in assigning the same function of 
blood-pumping to the heart, the rationale is importantly diﬀ erent. A particular 
exemplar of the heart has the function that it does in virtue of its ancestry. 
There has been a long line of organs that more often than not succeeded 
in pumping blood in the past and the present exemplar is their descendant. 
Therefore, even if our particular exemplar fails to pump blood eﬃ  ciently, or 
even if it is so defective as to never having pumped any blood, we can still cor-
rectly identify it as the kind heart in virtue of its relation to the line of ancestral 
hearts that have enabled the survival up to now. In other words, we can assign 
a function properly in virtue of a background of normality. (That is why Mil-
likan speaks of “normal explanation”). 
We can see now that the historical concept of function is narrower than the 
systems view, in that the former is restricted to items that are products of design 
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of one sort or another, whereas the latter was applicable to any complex system, 
whatever its origin. In another sense, however, Millikan’s concept of function 
is obviously broader than Cummins’s concept. The historical function is identi-
ﬁ ed as such in relation to things outside of the system of which it is a part of, 
including things in a distant past. By contrast, the Cummins function disregards 
relations between a functional system and its surroundings or its origin.
We have already seen in section 2 that the historical account seems well 
suited for the purposes of establishing anti-individualism, since it enables us to 
run the familiar thought experiments. Dennett’s thought experiment featuring 
a vending machine whose powers to detect currency are aﬀ ected by an environ-
ment directly draws on Millikan’s construal of functional ascription. In section 
3, I explained that Burge does not like Dennett’s conclusion that functional, 
hence semantic, ascription remains forever indeterminate. But Burge does not 
like Millikan’s account of representation, despite its intentional realism, either. 
I showed that Burge sees these naturalist theories as two versions of “deﬂ ation-
ism,” namely a tendency to stipulate various minimal detection capacities in 
place of the robust concept of representation, which is at home in everyday life 
and scientiﬁ c psychology. Recall that for Burge, psychology types its kinds anti-
individualistically, yet there is no need to reduce it to some lower, presumably 
individualistic, level of discourse.
In view of this critique of deﬂ ationism, it is then surprising to ﬁ nd Burge sup-
porting his view of psychology by means of a twin story featuring the biological 
item that we have already seen in both Cummins and Millikan—the heart. Burge 
invites us to imagine a physical replica of the human heart placed in an alien body:
Something is a heart because its organic function is to pump blood in a circula-
tory system that extends beyond the surfaces of the heart. One can imagine an 
organ in a diﬀ erent sort of body with a totally diﬀ erent function (it might pump 
waste for example). The causal powers attributed to such an organ by biology 
would be diﬀ erent from those attributed to a heart. Such an organ would not 
be a heart, but it might be chemically and structurally homologous to a heart. 
(Burge 2007, 323)
Like Millikan, Burge is explicit that in order to categorize properly the physi-
ological kind heart, we must attend to something external to its instantiations—
namely, their selectionist history: 
To be a heart, an entity has to have the normal, evolved function of pumping 
blood in a body’s circulatory system. One can conceive of a physically homolo-
gous organ whose function is to pump waste—or even a physically homologous 
entity that came together accidentally and lacks a function. Such entities would 
not be hearts. (Ibid., 326; emphasis added)
Thus, in his claim that the heart and the alien waste-pump diﬀ er in terms 
of their divergent histories, Burge assumes the historical notion of function. 
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The point of presenting physiology as another special science that types its 
kinds anti-individualistically is to suggest that intentional psychology is no 
worse. If physiology enjoys respectability at least comparable to that of phys-
ics, then psychology should not be looked down upon, either. In accordance 
with his methodological decision to prioritize an actual scientiﬁ c practice over 
metaphysics, Burge seems to be suggesting that the claims of naturalism are 
satisﬁ ed by taking a successful explanatory practice in psychology and other 
special sciences at its face value. There is no call for trying to force that prac-
tice into a straightjacket of some reductive metaphysics.
However, I wonder whether the above defence of the respectability of in-
tentional psychology is entirely consistent with Burge’s anti-individualism. It 
is true that Millikan’s historical concept of function, exploited by both Burge 
and Dennett, appears to be anti-individualistic in character compare to Cum-
mins’s theory. For Cummins, who takes into account only the internal param-
eters of a functional item, there is no way to distinguish between a blood-pump 
and a waste-pump. In a parallel case, an individualist in psychology has no way 
of distinguishing between aluminium-thought and twin aluminium-thought as 
long as he restricts his attention to internal parameters of a thinker alternat-
ing between two environments. Millikan provides a resource for drawing the 
required distinction. A heart is distinct from a waste-pump in terms of its 
divergent evolutionary origin.
Yet recall Burge’s recent deﬁ nition of anti-individualism that I quoted at the 
outset. It is meant as a theory of the very nature of representational mental states. 
That means it is not merely a theory of description of these states. It does not 
merely say that in speaking of representations, we should mention their relations 
to an environment. Dennett could be easily critiqued as misinterpreting anti-in-
dividualism as a descriptive, rather than metaphysical, theory. In his thought ex-
periment about the vending machine, we saw him making an explicit assumption 
that the machine goes into a particular state that could be described diﬀ erently 
relative to an environment. If so, the nature of such a state should be identiﬁ able 
independently of its various environmental descriptions. In fact, Dennett in at 
least one text admits as much. For evidence of Dennett’s betrayal of externalism, 
see his response to Frank Jackson: “So let me conﬁ rm Jackson’s surmise that 
I am a behaviorist; I unhesitatingly endorse the claim that ‘necessarily, if two 
organisms are behaviorally alike, they are psychologically exactly alike’” (Den-
nett 1993, 923). Vending machines certainly behave the same: accepting coins 
and churning out bottles of soft drink. So some narrow description of what they 
represent must in principle be available, too. The description of machines which 
takes into account such facts as their location in the US or Panama, respectively, 
is something extraneous. And this might perhaps help to ﬁ nd a correlate of envi-
ronmentally identiﬁ ed state at the sub-personal, or syntactic, level.
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Now, the above critique of Dennett as a closet individualist, or perhaps 
someone who just misunderstood anti-individualism, can unfortunately be ex-
tended to Burge’s own theorizing about the autonomy of intentional psychol-
ogy. It is crucial to realize that there is a narrow, individualistic way of identi-
fying both the heart and its alien counterpart: they are both a kind of pump. 
If so, an environmental description of this organ is strictly speaking optional, 
since we can descend to a lower, individualistic level. It is true that Burge is 
speaking of biology (or perhaps physiology), but the point of his example 
clearly is that psychology is analogous to biology. In section 1, I quoted Burge 
putting the heart example to a somewhat diﬀ erent use—namely, arguing that 
this organ does not consist of its external relations—but even here, he said: “I 
think that representational mind is like that” (Burge 2010, 66). So, Burge ap-
pears to take an analogy between psychology and biology very seriously. And 
yet, elsewhere he opposed attempts to dilute anti-individualism to a mere the-
ory of description in terms of environmental relations. He said that in lower-
level science, we often do have alternative ways of identifying the instances of 
explanatory kinds. In psychology, this is not available. “We have no such ways 
of identifying states of the body that (putatively) are beliefs, independently of 
assumptions about the beliefs” (Burge 2007, 353). Accordingly, though both 
the heart and an alien organ belong to the kind pump, there is no way to iden-
tify a thought individualistically.
I conclude that both naturalistic attempts to found representation ultimate-
ly in evolutionary biology and Burge’s nonreductive attempt to preserve the au-
tonomy of intentional psychology are ridden with problems. Burge may be right 
that what Dennett or Millikan succeeded in deriving from biology is not rep-
resentation, as it is understood in everyday life and psychology, but something 
too minimalistic. On the other hand, Burge, despite his claim that a widespread 
fear of reductive metaphysics is simply a prejudice, still seems wishing to con-
nect psychology with biology, which entangles his account in an inconsistency.
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